Internal control & corporate governance index: an empirical analysis of the Italian listed companies by Devalle, A et al.
Risk Management and Corporate Strategies 515 
Internal control & corporate 
governance index: an empirical 
analysis of the Italian listed 
companies 
Authors 
? Alain Devalle, Associate Professor,  alain.devalle@unito.it  - University of Turin  
? Valter Cantino, Full Professor,  valter.cantino@unito.it - University of Turin 
? Fabio Rizzato, Assistant Professor,  fabio.rizzato@unito.it - University of Turin 
? Alessandro Zerbetto, Ph.D., alessandro.zerbetto@unito.it - University of Turin 
 
Abstract  
Internal control is defined by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management 
and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achieve-
ment of better effectiveness and efficiency of operations, better reliability of financial re-
porting and better compliance with applicable laws and regulations. To achieve these ob-
jectives, the organization applies  the process of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) in 
strategy settings and across the enterprise, in order to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk within its risk appetite”. Thus, it is possible to highlight 
the importance of Internal control in the Risk assessment process of a company. 
Our research analyzed the corporate governance in the Italian context. In particular, the 
aim of the paper is to analyze the structure of the Internal Control System (ICS) of the Ital-
ian listed companies. We constructed a specific index, called “internal Control and Corpo-
rate Governance index” that measures the quality of corporate governance composition. 
The index construction is based on an in-depth literature review and a selection of the in-
ternational ICS best practices which were more suitable for the Italian context. Secondly, 
we have investigated the key variables that influence the structure of the Internal control 
System in the Italian context. 
The sample was made up of the listed companies belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange 
(FTSE Italia All Share). The composition of the index refers to the year 2013 and in total 
159 listed companies were analyzed. For each company we have collected 33 items in or-
der to evaluate the internal control system of a company: for each entity, we investigated 
7 independent variables divided into performance, size, shareholders’ composition, for-
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eign capital, percentage of state capital, leverage and sector variables. In total, we hand 
collected 5,247 items (33 items multiplied by 159 entities). 
The methodology used to assess the determinants of the quality of corporate governance 
is based on the OLS regression model consistent with the main literature review (Cerf 
(1961); Stanga (1976); McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982); Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987); Cooke (1991 2 1992); Botosan (1997); Depoers (2000); Glaum and Street (2003)). 
Results show that the adjusted R^2 is equal to 0.300, which is an acceptable value espe-
cially when taking into account the nature of the values of the dependent variables (sub-
jective). 
Our results suggest that size, state ownership and the presence of several foreign funds in 
the ownership are significantly and positively related to ICS quality. However, return on 
assets is significantly and negative related to ICS quality.  
In conclusion we can state that the internal control system of the Italian companies is 
compliant with the international best practices, even if our research suggest some im-
provements which need to be made. 
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1 Introduction 
The separation between ownership and control, and its consequences is a 
topic that has fueled a huge debate in the last years. Differently from Coase, 
1937, who defines firms as a nexus of contracts, where managers act for reach-
ing exclusively shareholders' interests, Jensen & Meckling, 1976 argue that com-
panies require monitoring mechanisms in order to minimize agency costs de-
termined by potential risk of irregular activities carried out from top managers. 
As a result of agency theory, corporate governance has become one of the most 
debated topic of the century’s last twenty years. During this period, where cor-
porate governance is defined as the way in which suppliers of finance to corpo-
rations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer & R. 
W. Vishny 1997), researchers investigates the link between specific aspect of 
corporate governance (such as audit committee, independent directors, takeover 
defenses and minority shareholders protections) and company’s market value or 
performance. 
Starting from the new century, great part of literature continues to investi-
gate the relation between corporate governance and firm value, but introducing 
new methods of aggregating more attributes on an index as a proxy for compa-
ny’s corporate governance quality (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2010; Bebchuk, 
Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Cremers 
& Nair, 2005; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The first work using a corporate governance 
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index is Gompers et al., 2003, which analyzes the companies listed on U.S. finan-
cial market developing a quality index based on twenty-four provisions (called 
G-index), showing that more democratic firms are more valuable. Later, different 
studies (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005) 
use similar indexes to associate firm’s level corporate governance and firm's val-
uation.  
However, as well as better corporate governance can lead to increase corpo-
rate value or at least, avoid the loss in value due to managers who do not act in 
shareholders’ interests, (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) there is a lack in literature in-
vestigating which set of factors can influence the adoption of better corporate 
governance quality, in countries with strong type-two agency conflict as Italy. In 
this paper we construct an index, named Internal Control and Corporate Govern-
ance index (ICCG index), in order to investigate Italian listed companies search-
ing for which set of factors influence the adoption of good corporate governance 
practices (Black et al. 2012 claims that country characteristics strongly predict 
which aspects of governance matter). 
The sample was made up of the listed companies belonging to the Italian 
Stock Exchange (FTSE Italia All Share). The composition of the index refers to the 
year 2013 and in total 159 listed companies were analyzed. For each company 
we have collected 33 items in order to evaluate the internal control system of a 
company: for each entity, we investigated 7 independent variables divided into 
performance, size, shareholders’ composition, foreign capital, percentage of state 
capital, leverage and sector variables. In total, we hand collected 5,247 items (33 
items multiplied by 159 entities). 
The methodology used to assess the determinants of the quality of corporate 
governance is based on the OLS regression model consistent with the main liter-
ature review (Cerf (1961); Stanga (1976); McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982); 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987); Cooke (1991 2 1992); Botosan (1997); Depoers 
(2000); Glaum and Street (2003)). 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes corpo-
rate governance functions and laws prescribed in Italian context; Section 3 de-
velops the hypotheses; Section 4 discuss the sample and presents the model; Sec-
tion 5 includes test, regression analysis and results; Section 6 summarizes the 
main finding of the study. 
2 Background 
Italian corporate governance framework and rules have been substantially modi-
fied since 1998 with the introduction of the Draghi Law.  More in general, Corpo-
rate Governance Reforms in Europe have been driven by three factors (Enriques 
& Volpin 2007). First, Kamar 2006 stated that reforms aimed to make national 
markets more attractive. Secondly (Ferran 2004) the efforts of the European Un-
ion was to institute a common framework of rules. Thirdly many of the corporate 
governance reforms are a response to national and international financial frauds 
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and scandals (Enriques 2003). These events have clearly shown the weakness of 
the worldwide and Italian corporate governance framework for both listed and 
non-listed companies. Therefore, in order to rectify the situation appropriately, 
the legislator, has tried to protect minority shareholders of listed companies. 
However, Italian corporate governance system it is still “considered poor, char-
acterized by an inactive takeover market, weak accounting standards, limited 
presence of institutional investor and where the legal protection for investors 
was low” (Buchanan & Yang 2005). Besides, the Italian corporate governance 
system is characterized by a high degree of direct ownership concentration, both 
for listed and unlisted companies(Bianco & Casavola 1999; Enriques & Volpin 
2007). The Italian corporate governance system may be classified in the Latin 
sub-group (De Jong 1997). Nevertheless, it has its own unique features, and does 
not entirely fit into the international standards models (Melis 1999).Finally the 
Italian corporate governance system is based on pyramidal firm structure. These 
characteristics emphasize that Italian corporate governance is very far from the 
Anglosaxon one, considered (La Porta et al. 2000) the strongest system which 
offering the highest level of legal protection to stockholders. 
3 Hypotheses development    
As mentioned previously, monitoring mechanisms are implemented to bound 
agency costs, ensuring to shareholders that managers are acting in their best in-
terest (Jensen & Meckling 1976). These mechanisms are for most part consid-
ered by corporate governance. Several studies assert that high quality level cor-
porate governance lead to best performance, or increase firm value (Ammann, 
Oesch, & Schmid, 2010; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Black, Jang, & Kim, 
2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Durnev & Kim, 2005; 
Gompers et al., 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). 
However, there is a lack in literature about which set of factors affect imple-
mentation of qualitative corporate governance practices, in country with strong 
type-two agency conflict. Our work want to fill this gap, investigating which 
group of firm’s characteristics influence a better quality of corporate governance 
practices in Italy. To achieve this result, we first analyzed international litera-
ture, searching for determinants affecting firm level corporate governance. We 
grouped the determinants into four categories: firm performance, ownership, fi-
nancial structure and size. By doing so, we considered the particular characteris-
tics of Italian companies as well as political and economic environment. 
3.1 Foreign Institutional Investor appeal 
According to Shleifer & Vishny 1986 and Karamanou & Vafeas 2005 the pres-
ence of blockholders in firm’s ownership positively affect corporate governance 
processes, introducing an additional monitoring mechanism. McConnell & 
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Servaes 1990 and Xu & Wang 1999 find that institutional investor appear to be 
more effective than individual shareholders in monitoring firm’s performances. 
Among these blockholders, Balasubramanian et al. 2010 identifies foreign inves-
tors as having a very important role; higher corporate governance is in their  in-
terest, and they are able in forcing the achievement of this goal due to the fact 
that are willing to pay an higher price for equity, exerting greater pressure on 
managers. Khanna & Palepu 2000 argue that foreign-invested firms are likely in-
sist on higher governance standards and on protection of minority rights. For-
eign investors are able to inhibit fraud for Chinese Financial market (Chen et al. 
2006). Moreover, Bianchi et al. 2011 report for Italian market, that higher levels 
of effective compliance to Italian code of Corporate governance (summarizing 
worldwide accepted good practices of corporate governance) tend to be found in 
companies with relevant holdings by institutional investors (particularly foreign 
investors) who participate in general shareholder meetings. Bianchi et al. 2011 
claims that foreign investors are able to monitor the firms they invest in, helping 
to discourage financial fraud and improve the effectiveness of internal control 
system. Bianchi et al. 2011 find positive relation between effective compliance to 
corporate governance code and foreign investors participating in annual meet-
ing, for Italian listed companies. We expect higher corporate governance stand-
ards for firms registering the presence of foreign investor in corporate owner-
ship.  
In this study, in order to investigate factors affecting corporate governance 
quality, we use the number of foreign funds holding relevant shares of the firm 
(NUMBERFOREIGNFUND) as a proxy for foreign fund interest in the firm. 
H1. There is a positive relation between presence of foreign institutional in-
vestors and ICCG index. 
3.2 State ownership 
Ben Ali & Lesage 2013 shows that audit fees are negatively associated with 
state ownership in France. This result is consistent with Sun & Tong 2003 re-
search, about the role of state ownership in preventing fraud and expropriation 
of wealth for minorities. The researchers claim that state representatives should 
effectively control managers, since in case of failure they may bear reputation 
costs, improving the quality of monitoring mechanisms. Black et al. 2013 find 
that fractional ownership held by the state is the most strongly predicting varia-
ble of corporate governance quality, proxied by their pooled corporate govern-
ance index (pool observations across Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, treat the 
country Corporate Governance indices as if they capture the same underlying 
construct). In order to avoid reputational costs, we claim that State stake can 
drive management in introducing higher corporate governance standards. In ac-
cordance with Black et al. 2013, we expect a positive relation between state 
ownership and corporate governance quality. 
H2. There is a positive relation between firm’s state ownership and ICCG in-
dex. 
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3.3 Family ownership 
Dyck & Zingales 2004shows that ownership is more concentrated in coun-
tries in which private benefits of control are greater, or rather countries with 
weak legal protection of investors like Italy (La Porta et al. 1999). In these coun-
tries ownership concentration is an efficient form of governance mechanism in 
order to control manager activities, but it potentially leaves minority investors 
unprotected (Shleifer & R. W. Vishny 1997). Indeed, large controlling sharehold-
ers could use their influence on management to assure the return on their in-
vestment even at expense of minorities' expropriation, defining the type-two 
agency conflict (La Porta et al. 1999). This assumption is confirmed by Boubakri 
et al. 2005 and Bai et al. 2004, asserting that concentrated ownership gives to 
largest shareholders substantial discretionary power to use the firm's resources 
for personal gain at the expense of other shareholders. Moreover, Hope et al. 
2010 argues that it is easier extract private benefits for major family owners, 
that can strongly influence the board or have the possibility of electing. Several 
studies show that large shareholders expropriation of minority shareholders 
wealth is even more achievable when companies record a poor quality of corpo-
rate governance and internal control system. For example, Chen & Jaggi 2000 
find that family ownership may reduce the independent directors effectiveness 
in convincing management to disclose more comprehensive information. Cheng 
& Firth 2006 find weak corporate governance and controls exercised by outside 
blockholders and independent non-executive directors due to the overwhelming 
power of executive directors in family firms. Anderson & Reeb 2003 find that for 
S&P 500 firm, outside directors are more prevalent in nonfamily firms than in 
family firms. Moreover, the researchers find evidences suggesting that if families 
seek to entrench themselves and extract private benefits from the firm, the lack 
of strong external monitors and discipline agents potentially permits them to 
pursue this path. Conversely, corporate governance and the control system are 
directed to pursuit the interests of all categories of shareholders, as well as cor-
porate governance deals with the way in which all the suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer 
& R. W. Vishny 1997). Thus, in order to maintain the private benefit of control 
and pursue the return of their investment, large shareholders need a lower qual-
ity of corporate governance and internal controls. In accordance with these as-
sumptions, we expect that in family firms the alignment between majority own-
ership and control is tighter, thus obviating the needs of comply to formal corpo-
rate governance practices and disclosure, aimed at protecting all stakeholders. 
H3. There is a negative relation between ICCG index and Families ownership 
3.4 Interest expenses on Financial debts 
As previously mentioned, Jensen 1986 claims that financial leverage influence 
management choices, thus in companies characterized by high financial debts, 
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managers have less discretion in using generated cash flows. As a result, non-
optimal investments are less probable. As well as leverage can be used as a tool 
for regulate managers' behavior, inasmuch as missing the debt repay can lead to 
bankruptcy (Shleifer & R. Vishny 1997), increasing debt level leads to a rise in 
interest expenses. 
Anderson et al. 2004 find that the cost of debt financing is negative related to 
board independence and audit committee independence, size and meeting fre-
quency. Their study focuses on bondholders’ situation and thus on the account-
ing-based debt covenant interpretation. Specifically, they conclude that bond-
holders consider the board and audit committee’s monitoring effectiveness as a 
source of greater assurance with respect to the integrity of accounting numbers. 
Moreover, Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003 provides evidence linking corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms to higher bond ratings and lower bond yields. Governance 
mechanisms can reduce default risk by mitigating agency costs and monitoring 
managerial performance and by reducing information asymmetry between the 
firm and the lenders. Moreover, Piot et al. 2007 finds empirical findings reveal-
ing that corporate governance quality has a significant reducing effect on the 
cost of debt, whereas audit quality does not. In summary, As well as financial 
debts are a tool to regulate management behavior, increase the quality of corpo-
rate governance is useful in order to mitigate interest expenses. However, im-
prove corporate governance is more useful for more levered firms. 
H4. There is a positive relation between firm’s interest expenses for financial 
debt and ICCG index. 
4 Sample selection and research design 
The previously stated hypotheses are tested using a sample of companies 
adopting the “traditional”12 corporate governance system, listed on the Italian 
Stock Exchange at the end of 2013. In Italy, financial markets are managed by 
Borsa Italiana Spa, that has been part of the London stock exchange group since 
2007. This private institution suggest to all listed domestic companies the volun-
tary adhesion to the Codice di autodisciplina per le società quotate, which con-
tains some of corporate governance’s international best practices. In addition, 
bylaw requires for every single company listed on the stock exchange to draft an 
evaluating document on the degree of compliance with the Code, and disclose it 
to the market. 
4.1 The Sample 
The Italian financial market can be divided into specific segments, identified 
by related indices (FTSE). Our sample was built considering the firms listed on 
FTSE Italia All-share, the stock index which excludes companies with the lowest 
capitalization (FTSE Micro Cap). Afterwards, we exclude foreign companies 
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listed abroad (following Barucci & Falini 2005), because they are subject to dif-
ferent corporate governance and disclosure regulations. In the next table is 
shown the sample’s procedure selection. 
 
Items N. 
groups 
% sample 
Composition of the FTSE All-Share 211 100% 
Listed firms using non “traditional” corporate govern-
ance system 
(7) 
 
Foreign listed firms (3)  
Domestic listed firms with uncompleted or unavailable 
data 
(34) 
 
Financial (bank and insurance companies, defined by 
Italian stock exchange) 
(17)  
Sample Analyzed 150  
 
As we can see in the table, the sample was made up of the listed companies 
belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange (FTSE Italia All Share). The composition 
of the index refers to the year 2013 and in total 159 listed companies were ana-
lyzed. We excluded from the sample companies that did not draw up the consoli-
dated financial statements and companies that do not have a traditional model of 
corporate governance (dualistic and monistic model). We excluded from the 
sample, companies that did not draw up the consolidated financial statements 
and companies that do not have a traditional model of corporate governance 
(dualistic and monistic model). In order to define the Internal Control & Corpo-
rate Governance index, we collected data from corporate governance report, 
while other informations (for example about Big 4 audit firm or not), were col-
lected from the consolidated financial statements. All these document refer to 
year 2013. 
For the 150 firms of the sample, we gathered hand-collected data from the 
mandatory documents published on institutional websites. We exclude banks 
and insurance companies because are subject to different regulations and sup-
plementary controls (for ex. from Banca d’Italia13). 
4.2 Dependent variables: Internal Controls and Corporate Governan-
ce index 
Like Gompers et al. 2003, (and several other researches creating an own qual-
ity index) that developed for the U.S. listed firms a corporate governance index, 
our Internal Control and Corporate Governance index (from here, IC&CGi) sum-
marizes the formal adoption of every sample’s firm to 13 corporate governance 
provisions. Most part of these practices originate from the Italian code of corpo-
rate governance “Il codice di autodisciplina”, grouping the recommendations sug-
gested by the Italian stock exchange “Borsa Italiana S.p.a.”. We integrate our in-
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dex with others international accepted best practices, like the independence of 
board’s chairman or the composition of the board, with at least 33% of inde-
pendent directors. We grouped the 13 provisions of our ICCG index in four cate-
gories: Board structure, Committee structure, other Control bodies structures 
and Minority shareholders’ representation. The CGI&IC index includes 6 factors 
that either 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the single firm’s governance 
practice is in line with the provisions analyzed. For remaining 7 factors of the 
CGI&IC index, we use dummy variable by recoding the values, of which 4 ele-
ments (regarding the internal subcommittee) with 4 intervals associated to bet-
ter level of compliance to the governance practices, others 2 elements (others 
control bodies) with 3 intervals, and finally 1 element (Minority shareholders’ 
representation) with 5 intervals. 
4.2.1 Board of Directors structure 
Fama & Jensen 1983 expanded on argued that a higher proportion of inde-
pendent directors on corporate boards would result in more effective monitor-
ing of boards and limit the managerial opportunism. Beasley 1996; Uzun et al. 
2004 found that firms with a high percentage of outside directors reduces the 
likelihood of financial fraud. Chen & Jaggi 2000 found a positive association be-
tween the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and finan-
cial disclosures. Currently, board independence is still considered the core ele-
ment of corporate governance (Dahya & Mcconnell 2008; OECD 2004). Klein 
2002 finds a negative relation between board independence and abnormal ac-
cruals. This means that a board composed in majority by independent directors 
can improve the integrity of financial reporting, and also of the internal control 
system. (Peasnell et al. 2005) finds that firms with a high proportion of outsiders 
in the board are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management. In 
our index we assessed the presence of non-executive director and independent 
director. Accordingly to international best practices, a balanced board of director 
should be composed by at least half of independent members (for example in 
Australia, the Australian financial market regulator require that the majority of 
board members be independent from management). We considered a best prac-
tice the case in which more than 33% of Board members are independent. 
Cortese 2009 reveals that boards of director for listed firms of ASX50, Australian 
stock index, are composed on average by 80% of non-executive directors. Also 
ACSI (Australian council of super investor) in a research paper of 2010 (ACSI 
2010) analyzing governance best practices for S&P/ASX 100 index in 2009, re-
veals that since 2005 the presence of non-executive directors are more than 80% 
of the total directors. We considered a best practice the case in which more than 
80% of Board members are non-executive. Other provision like CEO duality 
(Brickley et al. 1997), presence of Lead Independent director and the independ-
ence of the chairman are recurring topics, considered in different corporate gov-
ernance issues (Black et al. 2012; Henry 2010). One of the recommendation of 
Italian code of Corporate governance is the balance of power within the board, 
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thus the separation between CEO and chairman is advisable. In the case of CEO 
duality (or the case which Chairman is the person who owns the firm) is sug-
gested to appoint a Lead Independent Director, in order to rebalance the powers 
within the Board of Director. In UK and US, the dual appointment of chairman 
and CEO is seen to give too much power to the individual (Jensen 1993). Moreo-
ver, the Italian code of Corporate governance consider a best practice the intro-
duction of Lead independent director. We evaluate an higher governance quality 
the cases in which:  
? there is separation between CEO and board’s chairman;  
? chairman of the board of director is independent;  
? lead independent director is instituted. 
 
4.2.2 Board’s Committees structure 
The importance of sub-committee in the board, has rose in the recent years 
and is now  strongly established. Kesner 1988 claims that most important board 
decisions originate at the committee level, and Vance 1983 argues that the insti-
tution of four board committees (audit, executive, compensation, and nomina-
tion committee) can greatly influence corporate activities. Moreover, Klein 1998 
finds that overall board composition is unrelated to firm performance but that 
the structure of the accounting and finance committees does impact perfor-
mance. Several academic researches argue (Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996) 
that audit committees were associated with lower levels of fraud. Moreover, 
Davidson et al. 1998 find that the composition of a firm’s compensation commit-
tee influences the market’s perception of golden parachute adoption. In Italy, the 
Italian code of corporate governance suggest to every firm listed on Italian stock 
exchange the institution of four sub-committees, Audit, Remuneration, Nomina-
tion and Related Party transaction committees. We evaluated as good corporate 
governance practice the introduction of every committee suggested by the Ital-
ian code of corporate governance. 
An audit committee entirely composed by independent directors is an inter-
national best practice. In support of this assumption, Klein 2002 find a negative 
relation between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. Thus, 
an audit committee composed in majority by independent directors, can improve 
the integrity of financial reporting. Krishnan 2005 and others researches on in-
ternal controls fields (Bédard et al. 2004; Abbott et al. 2000; Uzun et al. 2004) 
find  that independent audit committees are significantly less likely to be associ-
ated with the incidence of internal control problems and reduce the likely of 
fraud or aggressive financial statement actions. In addition, Italian code of cor-
porate governance suggest to structure the internal board committees using in-
dependent directors. In accordance with these assumptions, we considered 
committees composed entirely of non-executive directors, the majority of whom 
are independent, two good  corporate governance practices. 
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4.2.3 Other control bodies Adequacy 
In compliance with the Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001 listed firms 
should establish a supervisory body whose primary duty is to ensure the func-
tioning, effectiveness and enforcement of company’s Model of Organization. This 
body is vested with all necessary powers to guarantee accurate and efficient su-
pervision over the functioning of the Organizational Model and Code of Ethics 
adopted, and compliance therewith, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 6 
of Legislative Decree 231/2001.The supervisory body consists of three to five 
members, appointed by the Board among qualified and experienced individuals, 
including non-executive Directors, qualified auditors, executives or external in-
dividuals. As well as others control bodies, in order to ensure the objectivity of 
judgment on the suitability of the organizational model adopted by the company 
and on its effective functioning, we have considered the appointment of inde-
pendent subjects in the supervisory body a best practice. Moreover, in accord-
ance  with Al-Malkawi et al. 2014, we considered the audit from a Big 4 firm, a 
corporate governance best practice. 
4.2.4   Minority shareholders’ representation 
La Porta et al. 1999 shows that countries characterized by poor investor pro-
tection, typically exhibit more concentrated control of firms than do countries 
with good investor protection. Indeed, widely held corporations are more usual 
in rich common law countries, where regulations ensure best legal protection of 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998). Chemin 2004 argues that in coun-
tries with good investor protection, controlling shareholders have less fear of be-
ing expropriated themselves in the event that they ever lose control through a 
takeover, encouraging the sale of shares and the reduction of ownership in order 
to diversify. In contrast, in countries with poor investor protection, lose the con-
trol becoming a minority shareholder may be such a costly proposition in terms 
of surrendering the private benefits of control. For La Porta et al. 1998, the agen-
cy problem in closely held firms is shifted between majority and minority share-
holders, with the former having the potential to expropriate wealth from the lat-
ter. This is the prevalent situation in Italy (Melis 2000). Until 2005, independent 
directors were almost always elected from controlling shareholders. But, as well 
as minority shareholder is the weak subject in countries registering the type two 
agency conflict, introducing directors ensuring the consideration of minority 
shareholders' interest lead to an increase in investor protection. This was the as-
sumption that led Italian government to introduce in 2005 the law 262, also 
known as “law on saving”, that required among other provisions, the introduc-
tion of at least one director appointed by minorities in the board of directors (by 
using the mechanism of "voting lists")(Zattoni 2006). After the introduction of 
262 law, Bianchi et al. 2011 find higher levels of effective compliance to corpo-
rate governance practices for Italian listed companies where minority share-
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holders have appointed one or more directors. This fact underline the important 
monitoring role of minority directors in reducing the type-two agency conflict. In 
accordance with these assertions, we argue that in companies registering the 
presence of qualified minorities, the appointment of directors elected by minori-
ty shareholders is a strong element of corporate governance. 
4.3 Explanatory variables  
We regress a number of 10 independent variable, of which 4 as explanatory 
variables and 6 as control variables. As previously stated, we considered explan-
atory variables NUMBERFOREIGNFUND as the number of foreign investment 
funds who hold shares of the company, moreover STATEOWNERSHIP as measur-
ing the percentage of shares held by state and FAMILYOWNERSHIP as the per-
centage of shares held by family or individuals. In addition, 
FINANCIALINTEREST represent the ratio between financial interest expenses on 
total revenues.  
We introduced these two last variables (FAMILYOWNERSHIP and  
FINANCIALINTEREST ) in order to study the special features of the Italian con-
text, in which there are many family businesses and (consequently) many enti-
ties using financial debts as preferred source to finance investments. 
4.4 Control variables 
As control variables, we used firm characteristics (firm performances, lever-
age and firm size) and other variables considered by several studies as potential-
ly affecting corporate governance quality. In particular we treated the following 
aspects: firm performances, ownership, financial debts and firm size.  
4.4.1 Firm performances  
Past literature asserts that good corporate governance practices positively affect 
firm performance (Ammann et al. 2010; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Cremers & Nair 
2005; Core et al. 2006; La Porta et al. 2000; Black et al. 2006; Durnev & Kim 
2005; Brown & Caylor 2006; Gompers et al. 2003). Black 2001 find a strong posi-
tive correlation between firm-level corporate governance and market capitaliza-
tion in emerging markets. Also Gompers et al. 2003 find a positive correlation 
between market value and corporate governance practices. While some re-
searches find consistent results using as a proxy of firm market value Tobin’s Q 
and market-to-book ratio (Black 2001; Gompers et al. 2003; Black et al. 2012), 
Bebchuk et al. 2009 find also a positive and sizeable relation between corporate 
governance quality and return on assets. Moreover, Klapper & Love 2012 use 
two different measures: Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm’s market valuation and 
return on assets (ROA) as a measure of operating performance. They find a posi-
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tive relationship between corporate governance behavior and firm performance, 
as measured by ROA, consistent with results find in Gompers et al. 2003 (where 
firms with weaker corporate governance have relatively lower operative profits 
in the United States). 
In this study, in order to investigate factors affecting corporate governance 
quality, we use return on assets (ROA, measured as ratio between ebit on total 
assets) as well as return on equity (ROE, measured as ratio between net income 
on equity) as two proxy for firm performances. 
4.4.2 Leverage 
Jensen, 1986, claims that financial leverage influence management choices, 
thus in companies characterized by high financial debts managers have less dis-
cretion in using generated cash flows. As a result, non-optimal investments are 
less probable. In other words, leverage can be used as a tool for discipline man-
agers' behavior, inasmuch as missing the debt repay can lead to bankruptcy 
(Shleifer & R. W. Vishny 1997). Furthermore, greater use of borrowings im-
proves lenders' monitoring activities (Henry, 2010). Black et al. 2003 and Ag-
garwal et al. 2009 include in their works measures of firm financial structure as 
control variables, for monitoring specific firm's financial risk. 
4.4.3 National institutional investor ownership 
In Italy banks often take large equity positions in firms, including firms to 
which they made loans. Theoretically, if institutions who are equity holders and 
lenders to the same firm are more effective monitors. Previous research argues 
that lenders occupy a unique governance position given their monitoring and 
control abilities. In particular, the argument has been made that banks have a 
comparative advantage in monitoring corporations due to their access to inside 
information. The bank lenders’ access to superior information, relative to the in-
formation available to bondholders, reduces potential agency costs of debt fi-
nancing (Fama 1985). 
4.4.4 FTSE MIB 
As well as firm size, the market capitalization is observed in several studies as 
having an effect on corporate governance. In Italy, FTSE MIB is the index which 
aggregate the listed companies belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange register-
ing the high market capitalization. In particular, the index measures the perfor-
mance of the 40 entities listed on the Italian market that have the highest market 
capitalization. We expect that the entities belonging to FTSE-MIB  influence posi-
tively and significantly the adoption of good corporate governance practices. 
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4.4.5 Firm Size 
Past literature finds a relation between firm’s size and corporate governance 
quality. Large companies have to implement better corporate governance prac-
tices because they register greater agency problem, which result in greater in-
formation asymmetry. In order to contrast those problems, comes up the need to 
increase the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms. This hypothesis is con-
firmed by empirical evidences by Klapper & Love 2004 and Doidge et al. 2004. 
Moreover, larger firms tend to attract more attention and may be under greater 
scrutiny by the public, leading to assert that size may affect governance structure 
(Durnev & Kim 2005). Barucci & Falini 2005 finds for Italian listed firms a posi-
tive relation between firm size and some corporate governance best practices, 
such as CEO and chairman separation, institution of audit and remuneration 
committee and the appointment of statutory auditors from minority sharehold-
ers. Finally, Black et al. 2006 find a positive relation between firm size and cor-
porate governance quality. In this study, we use the natural logarithm of revenue 
to test the firm size variables. 
4.5  Data and methodology  
Information and data about the provisions of the IC&CG index were collected 
from the corporate governance report published by every listed firm on its insti-
tutional websites. In order to complete the requested information of IC&CG in-
dex (for example, information about Big 4 audit firm or not)  we used data pro-
vided by firm’s annual report. Instead, information about independent variables 
were gathered  from official databases; in particular for ownership structure we 
used data provided by CONSOB website (the Italian financial market regulator) 
while for financial data we used Aida - Bureau van Dijk database. 
The methodology used in our research is based on the following OLS regres-
sion model consistent with the main literature review (Cerf 1961; Stanga 1976; 
McNally, Eng & Hasseldine 1982; Chow & Wong-Boren 1987; Wallace 1987; 
Cooke 1991; Cooke 1992; Botosan 1997; Depoers 2000; Glaum & Street 2003): 
 
?????????? ? ? ? ?????? ? ???????? ? ??????????????????????
? ??????????????????? ? ????????????????????
? ?????????????????????????? ? ?????????????
? ?????????????????????? ? ????????????? ? ??????????? ? ?? 
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Where:14 
 
ROA = Return On Asset equal to Ebit on Total assets 
ROE = Return On Equity equal to Net income on Equi-
ty 
??????????????????? = Number of external foreign found holding 
Shares 
?????? ???????? = State Ownership equal to the total number of 
share owned by state (or state agency) on total 
number of shares outstanding  
???????????????? = Family Ownership equal to the total number of 
share owned by a family (or a single person) 
divided by the total number of shares outstand-
ing 
????????????? ???????? = Institutional Ownership equal to the total num-
ber of share owned by national institutional in-
vestors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding 
???????? = Ratio between financial debt and total assets 
?????????????????? = Financial Interest equal to financial interest on 
the total revenues 
???????? = Firms belonging to the FTSE MIB Index 
????? = Natural logarithm of revenue 
 
All the variables are then described. 
The variable ROA represents the level of performance registered by the firm, 
as the ratio of Ebit to Total Assets. The coefficient on ROA (α1) thus captures the 
corporate governance level related to firm performance. As prior literature 
states a positive relation between firm level corporate governance and firm’s 
performance, we expect α1 to be positive. 
The variable ROE represents the level of performance registered by the equi-
ty investors, as the ratio of Net Income to Total Equity. The coefficient on ROE 
(α1) thus captures the corporate governance level related to firm performance. 
As prior literature states a positive relation between firm level corporate gov-
ernance and firm’s performance, we expect α1 to be positive. 
Moreover, the test variable for H1 is NUMBERFOREIGNFUND and represent 
the foreign investor appeal of a firm, as proxied by the number of foreign funds 
owning shares of the firm. The coefficient on NUMBERFOREIGNFUND (α3) thus 
captures corporate governance level related to firm’s financial structure. As H1 
states a negative relation between firm level corporate governance and firm’s 
foreign investor appeal, we expect α3  to be positive. In addition, the test variable 
for H2 is STATEOWNERSHIP, and represent the state stake of in the firm, as the 
percentage of shares owned by the state. The coefficient on STATEOWNERSHIP 
(α4 ) thus captures the corporate governance level related to the state stake of in 
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the firm. As H3 states a positive relation between firm level corporate govern-
ance and state ownership, we expect α4  to be positive. 
In addition, the test variable for H3 is FAMILYOWNERSHIP, and represent the 
family or individual stake in the firm, as the percentage of shares owned by fami-
ly or individuals. The coefficient on FAMILYOWNERSHIP (α4 ) thus captures the 
corporate governance level related to the family or individual stake in a firm. As 
H3 states a positive relation between firm level corporate governance and family 
or individual ownership, we expect α4  to be positive. 
The variable INSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIP represents the national institu-
tional investor stake in a firm, as percentage of shares owned by national institu-
tional investor. The coefficient on INSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIP  (α6) thus cap-
tures the corporate governance level related to institutional investor stake. As 
prior literature states a positive relation between firm level corporate govern-
ance and institutional investor stake, we expect α6 to be positive. 
The variable LEVERAGE represent the financial structure of a firm, as proxied 
by the ratio of financial debts to Total Assets. The coefficient on LEVERAGE (α7) 
thus captures corporate governance level related to firm’s financial structure. As 
prior literature states a positive relation between firm level corporate govern-
ance and firm’s financial structure, we expect α7 to be positive. 
In addition, the test variable for H4 is FINANCIALINTEREST, and represent 
the cost of financial debts, as the ratio of financial interest expenses to total rev-
enues. The coefficient on FINANCIALINTEREST (α8) thus captures the corporate 
governance level related to the cost of financial debts. As H4 states a positive re-
lation between firm level corporate governance and cost of financial debts, we 
expect α8 to be positive. 
The dummy variable FTSEMIB represents the most important listed firms,  as 
the firm classified in FTSE MIB index, aggregating the most capitalized firms. The 
coefficient on FTSEMIB (α9) thus captures the corporate governance level relat-
ed to firm capitalization. As prior literature states a positive relation between 
firm level corporate governance and firm capitalization, we expect α9 to be posi-
tive. 
The variable LOGREV represents the firm size of a firm, as the natural loga-
rithm of revenues. The coefficient on LOGREV (α10) thus captures the corporate 
governance level related to firm size. As prior literature states a positive relation 
between firm level corporate governance and firm size, we expect α10 to be posi-
tive. 
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5 Test and Results 
5.1  Descriptive statistics 
The main items of descriptive statistics are shown below. 
 
 Min. Max. Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
25% 
percentile 
75% 
percentile 
ICCG index 0.2440 0.8460 0.5677 0.5580 
0.127
0 
0.4735 
0.667
0 
ROA -0.6892 0.3017 0.0160 0.0290 
0.095
5 
-
0.0683 
0.063
0 
ROE -3.9844 4.8158 
-
0.0419 
0.0339 
0.658
5 
-
0.0683 
0.120
4 
Number of 
Foreign 
Founds 
0.00 6 0.9400 1 
1.136
5 
0.00 
1.250
0 
State Owner-
ship 
0.00 0.6900 0.0152 
0.0
0 
0.136
5 
0.00 0.00 
Family Own-
ership 
0.00 0.8970 0.3977 0.5100 
0.256
7 
0.1262 
0.583
2 
Institutional 
ownership 
0.00 0.4300 0.0265 
0.0
0 
0.057
4 
0.00 
0.030
0 
Leverage 0.00 1.7168 0.3466 0.3060 
0.257
0 
0.1805 
0.453
9 
Financial in-
terest ex-
penses 
0.00 0.4290 0.0371 0.0166 
0.061
0 
0.0083 
0.037
40 
FTSE MIB 0.00 1 0.1733 
0.0
0 
0.379
8 
0.00 0.00 
Natural loga-
rithm of rev-
enues 
0.6900 11.660 5.8583 5.6131 
2.074
5 
4.3207 
7.195
6 
 
The table illustrates, with regard to the 150 firms observed in the year 2013, 
the descriptive statistics for the variables under consideration. Data regarding 
ICCG index show a stable distribution of the 150 firms of the sample. On average, 
ICCG index reaches a value of 56.8%, a lowest value of 24.4% and a highest of 
84.6%. 75% of the observations have ICCG index value lower than 66.70%. This 
means that in the Italian case the measurement of corporate governance quality 
is still an important topics, and for this reason is interesting to evaluate which 
are the main determinants affecting our IC&CG index.  
Data on Roa suggest that 25% of firms sample have registered in 2013 a nega-
tive value. Moreover, the average value has been 1.6 %, with a lowest value of -
68.9% and an highest value of 30.2%. This value, together with ROE registering a 
mean value of -4.19% shows that in 2013, Italian listed groups' performances 
are affected by the crisis as well as all over the world.  
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With reference to the presence of foreign investor funds, descriptive statistics 
shows that 82 firms out of 150 has a foreign fund holding more than 2 % of total 
shares. In 37 companies there are two or more foreign funds holding at least 2% 
of shares (each). Instead, 68 firms have not registered the presence of a relevant 
amount of share from a foreign fund.  
Family Ownership, is based on the presence of a family, an individual, or an 
intermediate company representing a family, holding a relevant amount of firm 
shares. Average is about 39.77%. This data provide evidence that Italian stock 
market is composed mostly of family firms as well as  it is coherent with the Ital-
ian market 
With reference to leverage, we have not found negative values, but we found 
two firms totally using equity capital as financial source. The italian listed firms 
of our sample have a financial structure composed, on average, by 35.26% from 
financial debts, on the other hands the average weight of equity on total assets is 
about 28.7%, confirming the widespread conception that Italian companies have 
one of the lowest level of equity, compared to total assets among the large econ-
omies (Melis 2000). 
5.2  Regression analysis and results 
Next table show the result of the OLS regression. 
 
Dependent variable: ICCGindex 
Explanatory variables Predicted sign OLS 
  Beta 
Standard 
error 
t-statistics 
Constant   0.041 10.773 
ROA + -0.171** 0.106 -2.145 
ROE  0.059 0.015 0.753 
NUMBERFOREIGNFUND + 0.197*** 0.009 2.580 
STATEOWNERSHIP + 0.141* 0.080 1.643 
FAMILYOWNERSHIP   - -0.077 0.042 -0.919 
INSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIP   + -0.007 0.172 -0.086 
LEVERAGE + 0.010 0.040 0.124 
FINANCIALINTERESTEXPENSES + 0.148* 0.181 1.695 
FTSE MIB + 0.196** 0.031 2.141 
LOGREV + 0.275*** 0.006 2.916 
     
Sample 150    
R-square 0.347    
F-statistics 7,395    
 *     Significant p < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
 **   Significant p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
 *** Significant p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
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As we can see from previous  table, only some variables strongly influence the 
Internal Control & Corporate Governance index. In particular, there are two vari-
ables that significantly affect the quality of Corporate Governance in the italian 
context: the number of foreign funds and the natural logarithm of revenues. 
The results show that the presence of foreign funds significantly (p<0.01) and 
positively (B=.197) influence our index. Moreover, the bigger is the number of 
foreign funds, higher is the quality of corporate governance practices. 
In second place, the natural logarithm of revenues significantly (p<0.01) and 
positively (B=.257) influence our index. This is an interesting result, showing 
that italian firms registering higher value of revenues have introduced better 
corporate governance practices. Moreover, the membership to the FTSE MIB in-
dex is significantly (p<0.05) and positively (B=.196) correlated to of corporate 
governance quality. The companies belonging to the most important italian fi-
nancial index registered an higher quality level of corporate governance, in par-
ticular with regard to the presence of non-executive directors, presence of inde-
pendent directors and CEO duality. 
The independent variable Roa is the only one significantly (p<0.05) but negative-
ly (B=–.171) correlated with our IC&CG index. This finding refute our predicted 
sign, suggesting that firms with higher ROA did not pursued the implementation 
of the best corporate governance practices. Finally, State Ownership and Finan-
cial Interest Expenses positively influence Corporate Governance quality, but 
with lower significance. In details, state ownership significantly (p<0.1) and pos-
itively (B=.141) influence our index, as well as Financial interest expenses (regis-
tering significative (p<0.1) and positive (B=.148) relation). 
This means that higher percentage of financial interest expenses on revenues 
leads to better Corporate Governance quality, in order to represent both control-
ling and minority interests. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper examines which factors influence the implementation of good cor-
porate governance practices for Italian companies. The analyzed factors are: 
proportion of shares held by families, proportion of shares held by the state, 
number of foreign funds holding shares, firm’s debt burden. 
We tested the hypothesis of a positive effect of state ownership on corporate 
governance quality. The results confirm the positive relation between percent-
age of share held by the state and corporate governance quality. Conversely, with 
regard to family ownership, we tested the hypothesis of a negative effect on cor-
porate governance quality. The results confirm the negative relation between 
percentage of share held by families and corporate governance quality, but with-
out a strong and relevant correlation. Instead, considering the number of foreign 
funds holding shares, we tested the hypothesis of a positive effect on corporate 
governance quality. The results confirm the positive significant relation between 
number of foreign funds present in the ownership and corporate governance 
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quality. Finally, with regard to company level of debt, we tested the hypotheses 
of a positive effect of burden debt, proxied by financial interest expenses, on 
quality of corporate governance. The results show a moderate effect on corpo-
rate governance quality. 
These results show that corporate governance quality for Italian firms is in-
fluenced by ownership characteristics, in particular positively by state owner-
ship and number of foreign funds, and negatively by family ownership. 
These findings highlight that in italian framework, foreign investors can play 
a key role in increasing the control mechanisms and investors protection for 
companies of which are shareholder. Moreover, a similar (although less im-
portant) effect is obtained in companies registering state ownership. These two 
assumption can be explained considering that italian financial market has low 
investor protection, where only more influential third parties have enough pow-
er to defend their interests, significantly affecting the management in order to 
improve corporate governance quality. 
Instead, we registered a negative effect of firm performance, proxied by Re-
turn on Assets as a control variable, on corporate governance quality in contrast 
with evidences provided by literature. 
Furthermore, it seems that Italian regulator has not yet been able to impose 
for family owned firms the introduction of higher corporate governance practic-
es, in order to improve minority shareholders rights. Our results confirm that 
Italian financial market is still marked by the benefits of control. 
 
Endnotes 
 
i
 In Italy, the traditional model of corporate governance is based on the contraposition between Board of 
Directors and Board of Statutory Auditors. This model split governance and control. The General As-
sembly appoints governance and control bodies separately, and independence requirements are dis-
ciplined by clear rules. Source: CNDCEC 
ii
 Bankitalia or Banca d’Italia, is the central bank of Italy and part of the European System of Central Banks. 
iii
 All the annual datarefer to the year 2013 
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